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We examined people’s understanding of the implications of the law of large 
numbers for prediction of social behavior and abilities. We found that people 
possess a partial understanding of the law: They sometimes recognize that one 
can predict more confidently from larger samples, but do not recognize that one 
can predict more confidently to larger samples. This partial understanding was 
reflected not only in the predictions subjects made, but also in the explanations 
they constructed to account for their predictions. It appears that people’s intuitions 
include the notion that increasing the size of the predictor sample of events 
increases predictability, whereas they do not include the notion that increasing 
the size of the predicted sample of events increases predictability. Q 1986 Academic 
Press. Inc. 
In the course of our daily lives we are constantly making predictions. 
We predict people’s future behavior from their past behavior, we predict 
behavior in one domain from behavior in another domain, and we predict 
our own attitudes from those of other people. In fact, all of our expectations 
about the world, about other people, and about ourselves may be viewed 
as based on predictions. 
It is therefore of great importance to determine how good people are 
at making predictions, and to what extent people appreciate and act upon 
the rules governing the predictability of events from other events. Failure 
to appreciate these rules could result in wrong beliefs, faulty decisions, 
and misguided behavior. 
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One of the most basic rules governing predictions is the law of large 
numbers. The implications of this rule to prediction are quite straight- 
forward: The confidence one may have in predictions increases with the 
size of the sample one is predicting from and with the size of the sample 
one is predicting to. Do people recognize this? Do people possess an 
intuitive understanding of the implications of the law of large numbers 
to prediction? 
The evidence bearing on this question is mixed. In a recent paper we 
have argued that people sometimes do recognize that predictability increases 
with sample size (Kunda & Nisbett, 1986). We found that subjects some- 
times understood that aggregation of the units of measurement increases 
the correlation magnitudes. This rule, termed the aggregation principle, 
was much more likely to be used when the events in question were 
relatively “codable,” that is, when the events were capable of being 
unitized and interpreted clearly (See also Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986; 
Jepson, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1983: Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda. 
1983). Relatively high codability exists for the domains of athletic and 
academic abilities. In these domains the units of measurement-games 
or tests-are clearly defined, and scores, once given, are straightforward 
and unambiguous. For such domains subjects made correlation estimates 
in accordance with the aggregation principle, realizing that, for example, 
grade in spelling for an entire term is better predicted by grade in spelling 
for another entire term than grade on a single spelling test is by grade 
on another single test. 
Codability is considerably lower, however, in domains involving social 
behavior, for example, friendliness and honesty. In these domains there 
are no obvious units of measurement, and no well-defined and agreed- 
upon method of assigning scores to behaviors. How, for example, does 
one determine how many units of friendliness are contained in a con- 
versation, or how much friendliness is expressed in a smile? In such 
domains people were less able to use statistical principles. Even for 
those latter domains, however, subjects were found to be able to use 
the aggregation principle to a degree when a “within” design was used 
that encouraged comparison of the degree of prediction to be obtained 
across levels of aggregation. With such designs subjects recognized, for 
example, that honesty over a large number of occasions is better predicted 
by honesty over another large number of occasions than is honesty on 
one occasion by honesty on another occasion. 
The conclusion that people recognize that predictability of events in- 
creases with the size of the predictor class of events and the predicted 
class of events appears to be challenged, however, by some findings 
reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1980). These authors showed that 
people do not appear to appreciate the implications of the aggregation 
principle for cases in which an aggregate is predicted from a single event 
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and vice versa. Their subjects erroneously believed that an aggregate of 
events provides a better prediction of a single event than a single event 
does of an aggregate of events. Thus subjects believed that the score on 
a full length intelligence test was a better predictor of the score on an 
abbreviated test than the score on the abbreviated test was of the score 
on the full length test. Similarly, subjects believed that the probability 
of an athlete’s winning the first event of the decathalon given that he 
won the decathalon was higher than the probability of the athlete’s winning 
the decathalon given that he won the first event. These judgments are 
in error because the predictability of the aggregate from a single event 
is identical to the predictability of a single event from the aggregate. 
Since the magnitude of a correlation is independent of the direction of 
prediction, aggregation increases predictability equally whether it is per- 
formed on the predictor or on the predicted events. 
In contrast to our results, these findings indicate that people do not 
understand the implications of the aggregation principle to prediction. 
Most disturbingly, Tversky and Kahneman’s subjects’ failure to appreciate 
these implications of aggregation occurred in the very domains where 
our subjects were best able to appreciate aggregation-the domains of 
academic and athletic abilities where event codability is high. 
These apparently conflicting results could be reconciled if people were 
shown to have only a partial understanding of the aggregation principle. 
People may realize that aggregation of the predictor class of events 
increases predictability, and at the same time fail to realize that aggregation 
of the predicted class of events also increases predictability. In other 
words, people may realize that it is easier to predict from larger samples, 
yet fail to realize that it is easier to predict to larger samples. 
Informal conversations with our acquaintances suggest that the notion 
that predictability increases with the size of the predicted sample of 
events is extremely counterintuitive. We have found that laypeople as 
well as many of our statistically sophisticated colleagues tend to respond 
with incredulity when we propose this rule to them. “If I can’t predict 
behavior in a single situation,” people often protest, “how can I be 
expected to predict behavior over 20 situations?” The answer, of course, 
is that 20 situations allow for a much more stable estimate of true score 
than does a single situation. Therefore the larger the size of the predicted 
sample of events, the larger the correlation is expected to be. 
A partial understanding of the aggregation rule could account for subjects’ 
performance both in our studies (Kunda & Nisbett, 1986) and in Tversky 
and Kahneman’s studies (1980). In our studies, subjects predicted ag- 
gregates from aggregates (i.e., total-to-total correlations) and single events 
from single events (i.e., item-to-item correlations). Thus their recognition 
that total-to-total correlations were higher than item-to-item correlations 
could have been produced by relying only on the left side of the equation, 
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that is, on the size of the predictor. The Tversky and Kahneman subjects, 
on the other hand, made judgments about total-to-item and item-to-total 
correlations. Here, too, the (mistaken) belief that total-to-item correlations 
were greater than item-to-total correlations could have been produced 
by relying only on the size of the predictor, which is greater in the first 
case, while ignoring the size of the predicted class of events, which is 
greater in the second case. 
In order to determine whether people do indeed possess such a partial 
understanding of the aggregation principle, it is necessary to ask the 
same subjects to make all four types of predictions: single event to single 
event, single event to aggregate, aggregate to single event, and aggregate 
to aggregate. By varying the size of the predictor and predicted classes 
of events independently in this way, it will be possible to assess the role 
of each in producing judgments about predictability. 
STUDY 1: ADHERENCE TO A RULE OF ASYMMETRIC 
AGGREGATION 
In the first study we examined subjects’ estimates of correlation as a 
function of the size of the predictor class of events and the size of the 
predicted class of events. We studied estimates both for the relatively 
codable domain of abilities and for the less codable domain of traits. We 
also compared peoples’ estimates of correlation to the actual correlations 
in these domains, in order to determine accuracy. Subjects’ estimates 
were examined in both a within design and a between design. 
Method 
Subjects were 131 University of Michigan undergraduates of both sexes who were 
enrolled in introductory psychology. They participated in groups of three to eight subjects 
of the same sex. As sex did not affect any of the dependent measures in this or the next 
study, it will not be discussed any further. Subjects were randomly assigned to conditions. 
They responded first in a between design. in which each subject provided estimates for 
both abilities and traits at only one level of aggregation. The numbers of subjects in the 
item-to-item, item-to-total, total-to-item, and total-to-total conditions were, respectively, 
36. 37. 39, and 19. Next, they responded to a series of intervening, unrelated questionnaires, 
and finally, each subject provided estimates of all four levels of aggregation for one of the 
abilities or traits, thereby providing data for the within-subjects design. Thus. the between 
and the within designs were both 4 (content) x 4 (level of aggregation). Nine subjects did 
not respond to the within questionnaire, leaving a total of 122 subjects for the within 
design. 
Using the same question format employed by Kunda and Nisbett (1986), subjects in the 
within version estimated correlations either for one of two abilities-spelling and basketball- 
or for one of two traits-honesty and friendliness. They were asked to estimate the probability 
that, for a given trait or ability, two individuals would maintain their relative rankings 
from one situation (or aggregate of situations) to another situation (or aggregate of situations). 
Each within design subject assessed consistency for one of the abilities or one of the traits 
at each of the four levels of aggregation: item-to-item, item-to-total, total-to-item, and total- 
to-total. [Estimates about item-to-item and total-to-total correlations constitute a replication 
of a study reported by Kunda and Nisbett (1986j.l Subjects in the between version estimated 
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the correlations for both abilities and traits at only one of the four levels of aggregation. 
[Data for item-item and total-total correlations in the between design were also reported 
by Kunda and Nisbett (1986).] 
The item for spelling was a single test and the total was the average of the 20 tests of 
a term. For basketball, the item was the number of points scored in a single game, and 
the total was the number scored over 20 games. For the two traits, the item was behavior 
in a single situation and the total was behavior over 20 situations, on average. The item- 
to-item questions for spelling and for friendliness read as follows: 
In Jefferson school students are required to take spelling tests each week in the 
21 week term. Suppose you knew that Johnny got a higher grade than Danny on 
one such test. What do you suppose is the probability that Johnny would get a 
higher grade than Danny’s again a few weeks later, on the last test taken that 
term? 
Suppose you observed Tom and Joe in a particular situation and found that Tom 
was more friendly than Joe. What do you suppose is the probability that in the 
next situation in which you observe them you will also find Tom to be more 
friendly than Joe? 
The remaining questions used the combination of levels of aggregation appropriate for each 
condition. For example, the total-to-total question about friendliness substituted “20 different 
situations” for “a particular situation” and asked the subjects to suppose that Tom had 
been found to be more friendly “on the average.” 
This question format has been shown to provide a highly sensitive measure of subjects’ 
beliefs about predictability, and was validated by the remarkable accuracy of subjects’ 
estimates in some domains (Kunda & Nisbett, 1986). Such probability estimates have the 
additional virtue of providing a direct measure of Kendall’s r which, in turn. yields by 
derivation an estimate of Spearman’s r: 
E(r) = sin rf7/2 (Kendall, 1962, p. 124). 
We report results in terms of these derived correlations, although all statistical tests are 
based on the raw percentage estimates obtained from subjects. We do this to allow readers 
to compare the present results to related results presented in this form by Kunda and 
Nisbett (1986) and also because this is a convenient way of communicating with psychologists, 
who often think about prediction in terms of correlation coefficients. 
Actual item-to-item correlations were obtained empirically by Kunda and Nisbett (1986). 
Correlations for honesty and friendliness are based on research investigating the cross- 
situational consistency of these traits (Bern & Allen, 1974; Chaplin & Goldberg, 1985; 
Hartshome & May, 1928; Mischel & Peake, 1982). Correlations for basketball and spelling 
were obtained, respectively, from the scores of University of Michigan basketball players 
and from spelling test scores in two fifth-grade classes. Actual correlations at the remaining 
levels of aggregation for each trait and ability were obtained by applying the Spearman- 
Brown formula to the item-to-item correlations. 
Results 
We will present first the estimates obtained in the within-subjects 
design. In such designs subjects are most likely to appreciate statistical 
principles (Fischhoff, Slavic, & Lichtenstein, 1979; Kunda & Nisbett, 
1986). Subjects’ estimates of the consistency of the two abilities (spelling 
and basketball) did not differ from each other at any level of aggregation 
nor did their estimates of the consistency of the two traits (honesty and 




FIG. 1. Actual correlations and correlations estimated in a within-subjects design, at 
all four levels of aggregation, for traits and for abilities. Open triangles indicate actual rs 
predicted by Spearman-Brown from the actual item-to-item rs. 
friendliness), so both ability and trait estimates were pooled together at 
each level of aggregation and so were the actual correlations (which were 
also close). 
It may be seen in Fig. 1 that for both abilities and traits, subjects’ 
application of the aggregation principle was based only on the size of 
the predictor sample of events. They entirely ignored the size of the 
predicted sample. In each case a 2 x 2 (size of predictor x size of 
predicted) ANOVA revealed a significant effect only for the size of the 
predictor, F(1. 61) = 63.05, p < .OOl for abilities and F(1, 59) = 4.20, 
p < .05 for traits. There was no significant effect for the size of the 
predicted class of events. The F(1, 59) for traits was approximately I, 
while the effect for abilities, F( 1, 61) = 2.36, .I0 < p < .15, was in the 
counternormative direction. 
Thus subjects did not differentiate in their estimates between item-to- 
item and item-to-total correlations, nor did they differentiate between 
total-to-item and total-to-total correlations. They expected the item-to- 
total correlation to be as low as the item-to-item one, and expected the 
total-to-item correlation to be as high as the total-to-total one. As a 
consequence, for abilities, where they were relatively accurate about 
item-to-item and total-to-total correlations, they underestimated the cor- 
relation when it was presented as item-to-total, t(61) = 5.94, p < .OOl, 
and overestimated it when it was presented as total-to-item t(61) = 3.12, 
p < .Ol.’ For traits, where they grossly overestimated item-to-item cor- 
relations, they also greatly overestimated both item-to-total and total-to- 
item correlations, both ps < .OOl. 
’ For this test the actual correlation was converted into a percentage estimate and treated 
as w. 
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For both abilities and traits, subjects’ estimates of the correlation 
between an item and the total were asymmetrical: They estimated the 
total-to-item correlation to be higher than the item-to-total correlation. 
The planned comparison between these two estimates was significant for 
both abilities and traits, r(61) = 6.92, p < .Ol and ?(59) = 2.57, p < 
.05, respectively. This asymmetry is similar to that found for Tversky 
and Kahneman’s (1980) subjects. The degree of asymmetry is greater 
for abilities than for traits, but there is more room for such asymmetry 
for abilities. 
In the case of abilities, subjects recognize that item-item correlations 
are much lower than total-total correlations. In the case of traits, subjects 
recognize only a very slight difference between item-item and total- 
total correlations. The comparison between the two is actually not sig- 
nificant by itself for traits. The slight difference between item-item estimates 
and total-total estimates for traits constitutes a failure to replicate the 
pattern found in the within design study by Kunda and Nisbett (1986) 
where subjects’ appreciation of aggregation was relatively good, and 
instead is closer to the pattern found with their between design, where 
subjects’ appreciation of aggregation was poor. The most plausible ex- 
planation for this is that subjects’ grasp of the aggregation principle for 
traits is so weak that answering all four questions, as they did in the 
present study, including those about total-item and item-total correlations, 
was sufficient to confuse them. In the Kunda and Nisbett (1986) study, 
where each subject only answered two questions, about item-item and 
total-total correlations, it may have been easier for them to focus on 
the important differences between questions. 
We found the same pattern of results for the between-subjects version 
of the study as we did for the within-subjects version. It may be seen 




FIG. 2. Actual correlations and correlations estimated in a between-subjects design, at 
all four levels of aggregation, for traits and for abilities. Open triangles indicate actual TS 
predicted by Spearman-Brown from the actual item-to-item TS. 
346 KUNDA AND NISBETT 
abilities and traits, but aside from that the results were almost identical. 
Subjects’ estimates were again based only on the level of aggregation 
for the predictor variable. The F( 1, 127) for size of predictor for abilities 
was 63.05, p < .OOl, and for traits it was 7.78, p < .Ol. The Fs both 
for effect of the predicted variable and for the interaction were both 
small and nonsignificant. 
Subjects’ responses in the between design also showed the same pattern 
of inaccuracies found for the within design: for abilities, they were relatively 
accurate about item-item and total-total correlation, but they under- 
estimated the item-total correlation, t(36) = 5.56, p < .OOl, and over- 
estimated the total-item correlation, t(38) = 2.83, p < .Ol. For traits, 
where they grossly overestimated item-item correlations, they also over- 
estimated both item-total and total-item correlations, both ps < .OOl. 
The results are thus quite clear-cut. Subjects made predictions as if 
they were guided by a single, mistaken statistical principle: Aggregation 
is important for predictor events but not at all important for predicted 
events. Thus subjects appear to recognize that stability of observations 
is important if one wishes to make a prediction .fiom them, but they 
appear not to recognize that stability of observations is important if one 
wishes to make a prediction about them. 
STUDY 2: ARTICULATION OF RULES OF AGGREGATION 
Subjects’ responses in Study 1 followed the pattern expected if people 
were relying on a partially correct rule that recognized the importance 
of aggregation of the predictor sample of events but did not recognize 
the importance of aggregation of the predicted sample of events. But 
these results, in and of themselves, do not yet permit the conclusion 
that people’s predictions are guided by such a rule, because the same 
pattern of responses could also be accounted for differently. In particular, 
it is possible that when people predict one class of events from another, 
their responses are determined entirely by the similarity between the 
two classes of events (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). Tversky (1977) found 
that small objects are judged to be more similar to large objects than 
large objects are to small objects. People judge North Korea to be more 
similar to China than they judge China to be to North Korea. In the 
same fashion, small samples might be judged to be more similar to large 
samples than large samples are to small samples. Hence small samples 
might be judged more predictable from large samples than large samples 
are from small samples. Indeed, this is how Tversky & Kahneman (1980) 
interpreted their data. 
The proposition that people do in fact possess and use the partially 
correct rule of aggregation would be strengthened if it could be shown 
that people are capable of articulating such a rule, and that they spon- 
taneously explain their responses in terms of this rule. Study 2 assessed 
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this possibility. Each subject was asked to make two predictions, which 
differed from each other either in the size of the predictor sample, or 
in the size of the predicted sample, or in both. If subjects’ responses to 
the two questions were not identical, they were asked to explain why. 
This within-subject design provides an even stronger test of rule ap- 
preciation than the within design employed in Study 1, because subjects 
were not susceptible to being confused by the presence of more than 
two questions. The strongest test is provided by the conditions where 
only the predictor or only the predicted sample size are varied. It seems 
fair to assume that if subjects do not appreciate aggregation under such 
advantageous circumstances, they simply do not understand the rule. 
It was expected that, once again, subjects’ responses would reflect 
appreciation of the effects of aggregation of the predictor sample and no 
appreciation of the effects of aggregation of the predicted sample. And 
the explanations subjects gave to account for differences in their responses 
were expected to reflect the same partial appreciation. Subjects were 
expected to articulate good approximations of the rule concerning the 
impact of aggregation of the predictor, but to be unable to articulate the 
rule concerning the impact of aggregation of the predicted sample. 
Method 
Subjects were % University of Michigan undergraduates of both sexes who were enrolled 
in introductory psychology. 
The predictions subjects were asked to make were identical to those employed in Study 1: 
predictions about basketball, spelling, honesty, and friendliness. Each subject responded 
to a pair of questions about one of the traits or abilities, at two different levels of aggregation. 
The pairs were obtained by pairing each level of aggregation with all the remaining ones, 
which led to the following six kinds of pairs: (1) item-item and total-item, (2) item-total 
and total-total, (3) item-item and item-total, (4) total-item and total-total, (5) item-item 
and total-total, (6) item-total and total-item. It may be seen that in the first two pairs 
only the size of the predictor sample is varied. in the next two pairs only the size of the 
predicted sample is varied, and in the last two pairs the sizes of both predictor and predicted 
samples are varied. Order of predictions in each pair type was varied orthogonally to 
content (basketball, spelling, honesty, and friendliness) and pair type. The full design was 
therefore 4(content) x 6(pair type) x 2(order) with two subjects in each of the resulting 
48 cells. Subjects were randomly assigned to condition. 
Each prediction appeared on a separate page. On the last, third. page subjects were 
asked: “If your answers to the questions on the two previous pages were not identical, 
please explain why.” 
Results 
Predictions. It may be seen in Fig. 3 that the pattern of results obtained 
for subjects’ predictions at each level of aggregation was similar to that 
obtained in Study 1. These predictions follow, once again, the pattern 
that could be expected if subjects recognized the effects of aggregation 
on the predictor sample without recognizing the effects of aggregation 
on the predicted sample. 
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FIG. 3. Actual and estimated correlations. at all four levels of aggregation, for traits 
and for abilities. Open triangles indicate actual TS predicted by Spearman-Brown from the 
actual item-to-item rs. 
ANOVAs for traits and for abilities yielded results similar to those 
obtained in Study 1. Separate ANOVAs were carried out for subjects’ 
first responses and for their second responses for traits and for abilities. 
All but one of the four Fs(1, 44) for size of predictor were significant in 
the correct direction, all at p < .OOl. The exception, F( 1, 44) < 1, was 
for first responses to trait questions, where the rule is expected to be 
least salient. All but one of the four Fs(1, 44) for the predicted variable 
were nonsignificant, with the exception of second responses to ability 
questions, which yielded a significant effect in the counter-normative 
direction, F(1, 44) = 9.16, p < .Ol. All but one of the four Fs( 1, 44) for 
the interaction terms were nonsignificant, with the exception of first 
responses to the ability question, F(1, 44) = 4.67, p < .05. Since this 
is the only case where a significant interaction was found, this finding 
is most probably due to chance. 
The pattern of results for traits is much closer to the pattern found 
for within design subjects in Kunda and Nisbett (1986) than to the pattern 
found for within design subjects in Study 1. This suggests that the four 
judgments required of within design subjects in Study 1 did in fact serve 
to confuse them. 
Examination of the pattern of responses provided by each subject 
yielded similar results. Table 1 presents the number of subjects in each 
pair type condition (collapsed over content and order) whose predictions 
were in the normatively correct rank order, and the number whose pre- 
dictions were in the remaining, incorrect, rank orders. It may be seen 
that in the pairs where only the size of the predictor was varied, the 
majority of subjects correctly expected greater predictability for the larger 
predictor (69%). But in the pairs where only the size of the predicted 
sample was varied, only a minority of the subjects correctly expected 
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TABLE 1 
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN EACH PAIR TYPE WHOSE PREDICTIONS FOLLOWED EACH PATTERNO 
Item-item < total-item 
Item-item = total-item 
Item-item > total-item 
Only predictor varied 
N 
12 Item-total < total- total 
3 Item-total = total-total 





Item-item < item-total 
Item-i&em = item-total 
Item-item > item-total 
Only predicted varied 
I Total-item < total-total 
10 Total-item = total-total 




Both predictor and predicted varied 
Item-item < total-total 13 Item-total < total-item 15 
Item-item = total-total 1 Item-total = total-item 0 
Item-item > total-total 3 Item-total > total-item 1 
’ Numbers in italics refer to correct patterns of responses. 
greater predictability for the larger predicted sample (19%). When the 
predictor and predicted sample sizes were varied simultaneously, 81% 
of subjects correctly recognized that total-total predictions are greater 
than item-item predictions, but 94% of subjects erroneously believed 
that total-item predictions were greater than item-total predictions. These 
results suggest, once again, that subjects appear to recognize that increasing 
the size of the predictor sample increases predictability, but do not 
recognize that increasing the size of the predicted sample increases 
predictability. 
Explanations. It appears, therefore, that subjects’ predictions are com- 
patible with a partially correct rule of aggregation. But do they actually 
possess such a rule? If they do, we would expect them to articulate it 
when explaining why their responses to the two questions were not 
identical. Subjects’ explanations were coded as to whether they reflected 
correct or incorrect beliefs about the impact of aggregation on the predictor 
events and about the impact of aggregation on the predicted events. Any 
expression of the idea that increasing sample size increases predictability 
were coded as correct, whereas expressions of the idea that increasing 
sample size decreases predictability were coded as incorrect. A small 
number of explanations did not fit either of these categories, and these 
were coded as nonanswers. Interrater agreement on coding was 92%. 
It may be seen in Table 2 that subjects clearly understand and are 
able to articulate the rule that increasing the size of the predictor increases 
predictability. In those conditions where only the size of the predictor 
sample was varied, the majority of subjects explained their responses in 
ways that reflected correct understanding of the impact of aggregation 
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TABLE 2 
NUMBERS OF SUBJECTS IN EACH PAIR TYPE WHO GAVE CORRECT AND INCORRECT 
EXPLANATIONS OF THE EFFECT OF SAMPLE SIZE 
Predictor Predicted 
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
Only predictor varied 
Item-item & total-item 
Item-total & total-total 
Only predicted varied 
Item-item & item-total 
Total-item & total-total 
Predictor and predicted varied 
Item-item & total-total 
Item-total & total-item 
12 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 
0 0 0 3 
0 0 4 7 
12 1 1 I 
14 0 0 0 
” N for each cell is 16. 
(63%), and none expressed incorrect beliefs. Two examples will help to 
convey subjects’ appreciation of the importance of sample size for the 
predictor sample. One subject, asked to explain why she estimated the 
total-item association for spelling test scores to be higher than the item- 
item association, said the following: “There is more data to use in the 
first question than in the second. On one test, Johnny’s results could be 
a fluke. After 20 the results are more conclusive.” Another subject, 
asked to explain why he said that the total-total association for friendliness 
was higher than the item-total association, said, “The first was higher 
because I observed Tom and Joe in 20 associations so I have more 
evidence to support that Tom is a nicer guy.” 
It may be seen just as clearly that most subjects do not understand 
that increasing the size of the predicted sample also increases predictability. 
In those conditions where only the size of the predicted sample was 
varied, only very few subjects expressed correct understanding of the 
impact of aggregation (12%). Indeed, subjects were more likely to express 
incorrect beliefs in these conditions (16%) than they were to express 
correct beliefs. The same pattern of rule comprehension emerges from 
subjects’ explanations in those conditions where both the sizes of the 
predictor and predicted samples were varied simultaneously. Here, a 
majority of subjects expressed correct understanding of the impact of 
aggregation of the predictor (81%). whereas almost none expressed correct 
understanding of the impact of aggregation of the predicted sample (3%). 
Here, subjects were just as likely to be incorrect about aggregation of 
the predicted sample (3%) as they were to be correct. 
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DISCUSSION 
It is important to note that the law of large numbers is probably best 
viewed not as a simple, unitary rule but, rather, as a complex set of 
interrelated rules. In its most general form the law of large numbers 
states that the larger a sample is the more likely it is to be representative 
of the population from which it is drawn. This broad statement has 
diverse implications. Some of the notions encompassed within its scope 
are that we may generalize with greater confidence from large samples 
than from small ones, that small samples are more likely than large ones 
to deviate from the population mean, that extreme scores are likely to 
regress to the mean, and that increasing the size of predictor and predicted 
samples increases predictability. 
The major thrust of most of the early work on statistical reasoning 
was to demonstrate people’s many failures to appreciate these different 
statistical rules, and the resulting view of people’s capabilities was almost 
uniformly bleak (Kahneman, Slavic, & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 
1980). More recently, a more optimistic view of people’s capabilities has 
emerged from research attempting to delineate the conditions under which 
people do appreciate statistical principles. Some of the notions that initially 
appeared to be missing from people’s intuitions (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1972, 1973) were later shown to have intuitive equivalents which could 
be used in familiar domains that lend themselves to statistical reasoning, 
and with particular problem structures. This was true for the impact of 
sample size on generalization and prediction and for the phenomenon of 
regression to the mean (Kunda & Nisbett, 1986; Nisbett et al., 1983). 
While we do not yet have a complete mapping of people’s understanding 
of the many implications of the law of large numbers, the present data 
suggest that although the initial extreme pessimism about people’s inferential 
abilities was exaggerated, extreme optimism is also unwarranted. It now 
appears that some of the rules derived from the law of large numbers 
do have intuitive counterparts, whereas others remain extremely 
counterintuitive. 
Using the same problem structures, in the same domains, at times 
even the same subjects, we found that people understand, apply, and 
articulate the notion that increasing the size of the predictor sample 
increases predictability. But we found no evidence indicating that people 
understand the notion that increasing the size of the predicted sample 
increases predictability, even in the within-subject designs that are most 
likely to elicit appropriate responses (Fischhoff et al., 1979; Kunda & 
Nisbett, 1986), and even for highly codable events such as athletic and 
academic performance which lend themselves easily to other types of 
statistical reasoning (Kunda & Nisbett, 1986; Nisbett et al., 1983). 
Why do people develop the particular partial version of the law of 
large numbers that they do? Why do they learn that predictability increases 
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with the size of the predictor sample and at the same time fail to learn 
that predictability increases with the size of the predicted sample? 
Our answer is by necessity speculative. We begin with the obvious 
fact that people induce rules from regularities found in the pattern of 
data available to them. It seems likely that this data pattern may encourage 
recognition of the importance of N on the predictor side far more than 
it does on the predicted side, for several reasons. 
First, we suspect that people normally treat the size of the to-be- 
predicted event as a given, and look for evidence of varying types that 
may serve as predictors. The to-be-predicted event might be, for example, 
Jane’s likely performance on the job, or John’s likely enjoyment of the 
party. One of the ways in which predictor evidence may differ is with 
respect to its quantity or level of aggregation. People discover, through 
a process of trial and error, that more evidence of a given type on the 
predictor side generally does a better job of predicting than less evidence. 
The reciprocal process, that of fixing the quantity of evidence on the 
predictor side and allowing the quantity of evidence on the to-be-predicted 
side to vary, does not normally occur. People are far more likely to 
search for various types of evidence needed to make a given prediction 
than they are to search for various types of prediction that may be based 
on a given piece of evidence. As a consequence, people learn about the 
importance of aggregation on the predictor side without learning about 
the importance of aggregation on the to-be-predicted side. 
Second, the available data patterns may be biased because of asym- 
metrical similarity judgments. This is particularly true for item-total and 
total-item correlations. Small samples may be judged as more similar to 
large samples than large samples are to small ones (Tversky, 19771, and, 
if predictability is estimated on the basis of such similarity judgments, 
small samples will be judged to be better predicted by large samples than 
large samples are by small ones. Repeated reliance on the representativeness 
heuristic in this way will lead to a pattern of predictions from which the 
partial rule subjects appear to possess may be induced. Thus we suspect 
that similarity judgments, or the representativeness heuristic, play an 
important role in shaping predictions. But we also believe that the pattern 
of predictions that results from repeated use of this heuristic leads to 
the induction of a broad inferential rule which eventually gains independence 
from the underlying similarity judgments, and may then guide predictions 
in its own right. 
Not only do subjects fail to induce the correct impact of aggregation 
of the predicted sample on predictability, but they actually tend to believe 
that increasing the size of the predicted sample drcrrases predictability. 
Ironically, they use this counternormative heuristic precisely in those 
circumstances where statistical reasoning is likely to be most salient: 
ability questions in the within-subjects design in Study I and second 
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responses to ability questions in Study 2. This suggests that this coun- 
ternormative heuristic, like other more correct ones, reflects recognition 
of the role of chance in predictions. But instead of realizing that chance 
influences cancel each other out with aggregation, subjects seem to think 
that the uncertainty aggregates with the number of events to be predicted. 
Whatever the reason for people having the partially correct rule of 
aggregation, we believe our studies show that people do indeed have it 
and often use it as a basis for predictions. The correct half of the rule 
is likely to serve them well. The ability to base confidence in predictions 
on the amount of evidence available can save people from overreliance 
on unreliable evidence as well as from underreliance on reliable evidence. 
But the missing half of the rule is likely to hurt their ability to assess 
confidence in predictions accurately, and may at times undercut and 
distort any benefits obtained through the application of the correct half. 
This is especially true in the case of item-total and total-item predictions, 
about which subjects were particularly unable to reason correctly. 
It is also important to note that although our studies show that people 
are capable of appreciating the impact of aggregation of predictors on 
prediction, it does not follow that they will always do so spontaneously. 
We have reason to believe that their typical performance may be con- 
siderably lower than their competence. Our within-subjects studies were 
designed to maximize the likelihood that people will use any rules that 
they possess. Other studies have shown that when the relevance of 
statistical rules is not cued by the use of within designs or by other 
means, statistical reasoning is less likely (Fischhoff et al., 1979: Kunda 
& Nisbett, 1986; Nisbett et al., 1983). 
It is hoped that, eventually, we will arrive at a complete mapping of 
people’s understanding of the many implications of the law of large 
numbers, and will also have more detailed knowledge about the factors 
that determine when and how people access and apply inferential rules. 
Such a mapping is essential in order to maximize the effects of statistical 
training on reasoning about everyday life problems (cf. Fong et al., 1986). 
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